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NOTE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS: EXPANDING THEIR CRIMINAL REACH
UNDER NIPPON PAPER'
I. INTRODUCTION
As the global economy expands into the twenty-first century, both
international trade and restraints on trade are growing exponentially. As
the value and scope of international trade increases, the subsequent ad-
vantages and disadvantages begin to disregard national boundaries in this
shrinking world.2 Multinational corporations have become commonplace
and foreign industries have increasing influence in the marketplaces of
other countries. We live in an age of international commerce, where deci-
sions reached in one corner of the world can reverberate around the
globe in less time than it takes to tell the tale.3 "However, extraterritori-
ality-a country's assertion of jurisdiction over activities occurring
outside its borders-is often controversial because every such exercise of
jurisdiction infringes on another country's sovereignty to some degree." 4
United States courts have seen fit to expand their jurisdictional
reach into civil antitrust actions predicated on wholly foreign conduct.'
However, the U.S. courts have never previously explored the jurisdic-
tional reach that is appropriate for criminal actions based on wholly for-
eign conduct. 6 In Nippon Paper II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit examined what may form the basis for a criminal prosecu-
tion under Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act for wholly extrater-
ritorial conduct.7 The First Circuit in Nippon Paper II rejected the argu-
ments that resulted in a dismissal ordered by the United States District
1. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Let. (Nippon Paper 11), 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998)(No. 96-1987).
2. Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1031 (1985) (applying a criminal statute to conduct occurring in Malaysia involving
drugs intended for distribution in the United States) cited in U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus.
Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (No. 96-1987).
3. Nippon Paper 11, 109 F3d at 8.
4. Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka & Yokota,
and "Footnote 15" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821 (1994).
5. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
6. Nippon Paper II, 109 F.3d at 4.
7. Id. at 1.
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Court for the District of Massachusetts in Nippon Paper I,' and held that
activities committed abroad which have substantial and intended effects
within the United States may form the basis for criminal prosecution
under Section One of the Sherman Act.9
This note will discuss the First Circuit's treatment of the statutory
construction of the Sherman Act, the "substantial and intended effect"
standard, and the doctrine of international comity. Section II will examine
the Nippon Paper II decision, which addresses the jurisdictional reach of
the United States in criminal antitrust prosecutions. Section III examines
the legal background of cases that led to the extrapolation of the doctrine
that formed the basis for the Nippon Paper II decision. Finally, Section
IV provides a legal analysis of the Nippon Paper II decision in light of
United States law and international concerns, and concludes that the Nip-
pon Paper II decision marks a significant growth of United States power
in the protection of foreign trade which impacts the United States.
II. THE CASE
A. Procedural History
Nippon Paper Industries Company, Ltd. (Nippon Paper) is a Japa-
nese corporation based in Tokyo that manufactures facsimile paper, popu-
larly known as "fax paper."10 Nippon Paper was formed in 1993 as a re-
sult of a merger between Jujo Paper Co., Inc. (Jujo)" and Sanyo
Kokusaku Co, Ltd., both Japanese corporations that had their principal
places of business in Japan. 12
In 1990, Jujo manufactured fax paper at mills located within Japan. 13
Jujo did not engage in direct export sales, but instead sold its fax paper
in Japan to unaffiliated trading houses.' 4 Jujo's sales were limited to two
8. 944 F. Supp. 55 (D.Mass. 1996) (Nippon Paper I), rev'd 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997).
9. Nippon Paper II, 109 F3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998)
(96-1987).
10. Nippon Paper 1, 944 F. Supp. at 58.
11. Nippon Paper II, 109 F3d at 1. Jujo was named a codefendant in the grand jury
investigation. However, between the alleged conspiracy agreement and the District
Court's decision in 1995, Nippon Paper was created as a corporation included Jujo, and
the government alleged that it had assumed Jujo's assets and liabilities. Because the issue
of successor liability was not raised before the Court of Appeals, the court decided to
treat Nippon Paper as the sole defendant and as if it, and not Jujo, were alleged to have
committed the acts.
12. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co. Ltd.., 944 F Supp. 55, 58 (D.Mass. 1996).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Japanese trading companies, Japan Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd. (JPP) and
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (Mitsui). 5 Both JPP and Mitsui exported the fax pa-
per to their respective subsidiaries in the United States and those subsidi-
aries in turn engaged in direct sales to customers within the United
States. 16
The alleged conspiracy originated at meetings that were held in Ja-
pan in the early part of 1990. Jujo and other Japanese manufacturers of
fax paper agreed to increase prices for fax paper to be imported in North
America.' 7 The government's indictment failed to specify which co-
conspirators attended these meetings but conceded that none of the Japa-
nese trade houses nor their American subsidiaries participated in these
meetings.' 8 The extent of the conspiracy arrangement was that Jujo and
the other manufacturers raised their prices for fax paper charged to the
Japanese trading houses.' 9 Thus, the U.S. Government also contended
that JPP and Mitsui became conspirators by agreeing to sell the fax paper
in North America with the newly raised price. 20 The indictment also al-
leged that in order to ensure the success of the conspiracy, Nippon Paper
monitored the paper trail and confirmed that the prices charged to the fi-
nal consumers were at the inflated price it had arranged'.2 In 1990 alone,
Nippon Paper sold thermal fax paper worth approximately $6,100,000 for
eventual import into the United States. 22 In December of 1995, another
Boston grand jury indicted U.S. and Japanese corporations and individu-
als for participating in price-fixing conspiracies. Jujo Paper Co. Ltd. and
Nippon Paper Industries Co. Ltd., both of Tokyo, Japan, were charged
with participating in a 1990 conspiracy to fix the price of fax paper sold
in North America. 23 That same investigation had already resulted in sev-
eral individual and corporate guilty pleas, with fines totaling more than
15. Id.
16. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D.Mass. 1996).
17. Id. citing Indictment at 7(b). Mitsubishi Paper Mills and New Oji Paper Co. had
pleaded guilty in September of 1995 and were fined a total of $3.55 million. John
Gibeaut, Sherman Goes Abroad: Landmark Decision Oks International Antitrust Prosecu-
tion, 83-JUL A.B.A. J. 42 (1997).
18. Nippon Paper 1, 944 F. Supp. at 58.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (No. 96-1987).
22. Id.
23. Id. Appleton Paper Inc. of Appleton, Wisconsin, its Vice President of Research
and Development, Jerry Wallace, and Hirinori Ichida, an executive of Mitsubishi Paper
Mills Ltd., of Tokyo, Japan, were also charged with participating in a 1991 conspiracy to
fix the price of fax paper sold to customers in North America. Id.
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$10 million, by the time that Nippon Paper I was heard in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 24 On January 4,
1996, service by certified mail of a criminal summons was made upon
Seiichi Masuko, the general manager of the larger of the two Nippon Pa-
per offices in Seattle, Washington.2 1 In January, 1996, service of a copy
of the criminal summons was made on Richard Parker, a partner at the
firm of O'Melveny & Myers, who had been active in the law firm's rep-
resentation of Nippon Paper throughout the grand jury investigation lead-
ing to the indictment. 26 Subsequently, in-hand service of the criminal
summons for Seiichi Masuko was executed by a United States Marshal at
Nippon's Seattle office.27
On April 24, 1996, a Boston federal grand jury had already returned
two separate indictments charging three Japanese fax paper executives
with price fixing in connection with the Department of Justice's investi-
gation into the $120 million a year thermal fax paper market. 28
B. Summary of the Court's Reasoning
1. Nippon Paper I
The U.S. District Court granted Nippon Paper's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a prosecutable offense under Section One of the Sher-
man Act.29 The court examined two major issues: personal jurisdiction on
the foreign defendants and the extraterritorial application of Section One
of the Sherman Act.30 The court focused its analysis of the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act on two questions: one, whether the gov-
24. Id. In September of 1995, Mitsubishi Paper Mills and New Oji Paper Co. agreed
to plead guilty and settle price fixing charges. Mitsubishi Paper Mills agreed to pay $1.8
million and New Oji Paper agreed to pay $1.75 million in criminal fines. Id.
25. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D.Mass. 1996).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Yoshihiro Kuachi and Noburu Kurushima were charged in a one-count felony in-
dictment with conspiracy to fix the price of thermal fax paper sold to a major customer,
Rittenhouse, Inc. Three Japanese Executive Indicted as Justice Department Continues Its
Probe in Price Fixing in the Fax Paper Industry, FDCH, April 24, 1996, available on
LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. According to the charges, Kurushima, an execu-
tive with Mitsubishi Paper Mills, and Kuachi, an executive with Kanzaki Paper Manufac-
turing Co. Ltd., met in Japan in 1991 and agreed not to discount the price of fax paper
sold to Rittenhouse. As a result, Rittenhouse purchased fax paper at higher prices. Id. In
a separate indictment, Koichi Tano, an executive with Kanzaki Paper Manufacturing Co.
Ltd., was charged with participating in a price fixing agreement from July 1991 until at
least February 1992. Id.
29. See id. at 55.
30. See id.
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emnment sufficiently pled its claim that a vertical agreement existed be-
tween Jujo and the trading houses; and, two, if not, whether the Sherman
Act reached the alleged horizontal agreement between Jujo and the other
Japanese manufacturers of fax paper.3' The court concluded that the gov-
ernment did not sufficiently allege the existence of a vertical agreement
and thus, the government would have to prove the existence of a hori-
zontal conspiracy.32 The court placed great weight on the presumption
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes, absent a clear ex-
pression by Congress to the contrary.33 The court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court had found that the presumption had been overcome in the
civil application of the federal antitrust laws,3 4 but asserted that the pre-
sumption carried greater weight when applied to criminal statutes.3" It
thus concluded that the line of cases controlling the extraterritorial reach
in civil actions was not controlling and the issue was open as a matter of
first impression.36
The District Court relied on the case of United States v. United
States Gypsum Company37 to declare that the language of Section One of
the Sherman Act required different treatment in civil and criminal con-
texts. By extending the Gypsum decision, the court concluded that crimi-
nal provisions of Section One were held to a greater standard than the
civil provisions and that the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act do
not apply to conspiratorial conduct in which none of the overt acts of the
conspiracy take place in the United States.38
31. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd. 944 F. Supp. 55, 63 (D. Mass. 1996).
32. See id. at 63-64. The court found that the only potential allegation of a vertical
conspiracy dealt with the early 1990 meetings and claimed that Jujo directed the co-
conspirator trading houses to implement price increases to fax paper customers in North
America and participated in telephone conversations and otherwise contacted each other
to maintain continued adherence to their conspiratorial agreement. Id. citing Indictment @
7(d) & 7(e).
33. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), cited in U.S.
v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 55, 65 (D. Mass. 1996).
34. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795 (1993), cited in U.S. v.
Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 55, 65 (D. Mass. 1996).
35. U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922), cited in U.S. v. Nippon Paper In-
dus. Co., Ltd., 944 F Supp. 55, 65 (D. Mass. 1996).
36. Nippon Paper 1, 944 F Supp. at 65. The Nippon Paper I court stressed the prin-
ciple that the interpretative flexibility in civil antitrust cases was antithetical to principles
of criminal law and permitting the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act to have extra-
territorial effect would present serious questions about notice to foreign corporate defend-
ants as to the criminality of its conduct; Michael H. Byowitz, et al., International Anti-
trust, 31 INT'L LAW. 413 (1997).
37. 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (Gypsum).
38. Nippon Paper I, 944 F. Supp. at 66.
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2. Nippon Paper II
The bulk of the defendants' argument was that Section One of the
Sherman Act should be measured differently in the criminal context than
in the civil line of cases that preceded the court's decision.3 9 In both
criminal and civil cases, the claim that Section One applies to extraterri-
torial actions is based on the same section of the same statute: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal."' 40 The First Circuit did admit that
"[w]ords may sometimes be chameleons, possessing different shades of
meaning in different contexts. ' 41 However, the Court also declared that
"[c]ommon sense is usually a good barometer of statutory meaning" and
that common sense suggested that courts should interpret the same lan-
guage in the same section of the same statute uniformly, regardless of
whether the impetus for interpretation is criminal or civil.42 This common
sense approach taken together with the "basic canon of statutory con-
struction, ' 43 led the court to conclude it was necessary to read the lan-
guage of the statute in a manner consistent with the prior Supreme Court
interpretation in Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California.44 The
court concluded that unless there were some special circumstances appar-
ent in the case, it would have to follow the lead of the Hartford Fire
court, which found that the wording of the statute evidenced Congress'
intent to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially in civil actions.45
39. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987).
40. Nippon Paper II, 109 F.3d at 4, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1. The remainder of Sec-
tion One provides the penalties available and states that "[e]very person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1.
41. Hanover Ins. Co. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1504, 1504 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990), cited in U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987).
42. Nippon Paper 11, 109 F.3d at 4.
43. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992) ("It is a funda-
mental interpretative principle that identical words or terms used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning.")
44. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
45. U.S. v. Nippan Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987).
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Nippon Paper and its amicus, the Government of Japan, urged that
special circumstances were apparent for reading the statute differently in
the criminal context. 46 The First Circuit decided that only five of Nippon
Paper's theories deserved discussion and did not comment on the other
theories. 47 The arguments that the Court deemed worthy for discussion
included lack of precedent, difference in strength of presumption, the Re-
statement, the Rule of Lenity, and concerns of international comity.
1. Lack of Precedent. Nippon Paper stressed that this was a matter
of first impression and this was the first criminal case in which the
United States sought to extend Section One to wholly foreign conduct.
48
The Court accepted this argument but declared it was "not impressed"
and that this factor was greater proof of the increasingly global nature of
our economy rather than Nippon Paper's interpretation that Section One
simply could not cover wholly foreign conduct in the criminal context.49
Due to other reasons (such as comity concerns), it has not been standard
practice for U.S. antitrust enforcers to seek criminal charges. However,
that is not a basis for concluding that the U.S. officials do not have suffi-
cient power to seek those punishments. Precisely because there was no
precedent stating whether Section One could cover extraterritorial con-
duct in the criminal context, it was a basis for the court to declare its
opinion. While Nippon Paper's assertions are understandable, it runs
somewhat contrary to the principles established by precedent and com-
mon sense.
2. Difference in Strength of Presumption. Both Nippon Paper and
the Nippon Paper I court stressed that the presumption against extraterri-
toriality operates with greater force in criminal litigation rather than
civil.50 The First Circuit rejected this argument by concluding that a pre-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). The Bowman Court discuss-
ing a charged conspiracy to defraud, warned that if the criminal law "is to be extended to
include those [crimes] committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural
for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of
Congress in this ,regard." Id. at 98. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422 (1978). The Gypsum Court held that criminal intent generally is required to
convict under the Sherman Act. Id. at 443. However, the Gypsum Court also made it
clear that intent need not be shown to prosecute criminally "conduct regarded as per se
illegal because of its unquestionably anticompetitive effects." Id. at 440. Thus, the Nip-
pon Paper defendants could be convicted of participation in the alleged price-fixing con-
spiracies without any specific demonstration of criminal intent to violate the antitrust
laws.
1999]
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sumption against extraterritorially is not any different or more resilient in
criminal cases than in civil cases.5
Nippon Paper argued that the presumption should be given greater
deference in a criminal case. Our judicial system draws a distinct line be-
tween criminal and civil actions. Each has different rules of procedure
and different burdens of proof. The basic assumption is that criminal
punishments are inherently more grave and thus should be applied with
more scrutiny than civil sanctions. The same principle could easily be ex-
panded to address the presumption against extraterritoriality. In the same
way that the U.S. is more concerned about the deprivations associated
with criminal punishments, it should also be more concerned with enforc-
ing those same deprivations on foreign citizens who are answerable to
their own domestic laws.
While it was an error for the First Circuit to dismiss Nippon Paper's
argument so quickly, that does not mean it would have been proper to
find for Nippon Paper in the case at hand. Even if the presumption
against extraterritorial application was more carefully scrutinized in the
criminal case against Nippon Paper than it would have been in a civil ac-
tion, the U.S. antitrust enforcers would have overcome that presumption.
The presumption would have been deflated by addressing Nippon Paper
executives' willful decision to violate the U.S. antitrust statutes.
3. The Restatement. Nippon Paper and the Nippon Paper I court
also claimed that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law sup-
ports a distinction between civil and criminal cases on the issue of extra-
territoriality.52 The First Circuit once again stated that this merely rein-
forces the traditional presumption of extraterritorially and provides no
helpful distinction between criminal and civil cases. 53 This decision was
proper for the First Circuit to decree. On this issue, the provisions of the
Restatement simply had collected the historical presumption and ex-
pounded that as their own position. The Restatement is persuasive but is
not precedent. Even if the court had found that the Restatement stated a
different distinction than the traditional presumption, it would have been
free to disregard such a distinction and decide against the Restatement's
51. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987).
52. "[I]n the case of regulatory statutes that may give rise to both civil and criminal
liability, such as the United States antitrust and securities laws, the presence of substantial
foreign elements will ordinarily weigh against application of criminal law. In such cases,
legislative intent to subject conduct outside the state's territory to its criminal law should
be found only on the basis of express statement or clear implication." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415 (1987).
53. Nippon Paper 1I, 109 F.3d at 7.
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provisions. As discussed in the last point, the distinction between crimi-
nal and civil could be accepted in general and would be found to be in-
applicable to the Nippon Paper II scenario.
4. The Rule of Lenity. Nippon Paper also asserted the rule of lenity,
which provides that, in the course of interpreting statutes in criminal
cases, a court should resolve ambiguities affecting a statute's scope in the
defendant's favor.54 The First Circuit conditioned the use of the rule of
lenity to cases where a statutory ambiguity exists and dismissed that no-
tion in the Nippon Paper IH case.5 The court concluded that since the
Supreme Court declared it was well established that Section One of the
Sherman Act applies to wholly foreign conduct 5 6 they were foreclosed
from trying to assert any ambiguity relative to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of Section One and thus, the rule of lenity played no part in the
Nippon Paper II case.57 Once again, even if the court had believed that
there was some ambiguity in the statute, it could not feasibility presume
it so ambiguous as to invoke the rule of lenity and preclude the govern-
ment from acting in the criminal field. Although the court could well be-
lieve that there was sufficient ambiguity to impose a higher burden on
the government in criminal cases, the ambiguity would not have been
sufficient to find the government impotent to assert any criminal provi-
sions of an otherwise perfectly enforceable statute.
5. Concerns of International Comity.58 The First Circuit explained
away comity concerns as "more an aspiration than a fixed rule, more a
matter of grace than a matter of obligation." 59 The First Circuit also re-
lied upon the suggestion of the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire that
"comity concerns would operate to defeat the exercise of jurisdiction
only in those few cases in which the law of the foreign sovereign re-
quired a defendant to act in a manner incompatible with the Sherman Act
or in which full compliance with both statutory schemes was impossi-
54. Id. See also Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411,.422 (1990); Crandon v.
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); United States v. Gibbens, 25. F.3d 28, 35 (lst
Cir. 1994), United States v. Ferryman, 897 F.2d 584, 591 (1st Cir. 1990).
55. Nippon Paper I1, 109 F.3d at 7-8.
56. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
57. U.S v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987).
58. International comity is a doctrine that counsels voluntary forbearance when a
sovereign which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction concludes that a second sovereign
also has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction under principles of international law. See Har-
old F. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Pub-
lic and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 n.1 (1982).
59. Nippon Paper 11, 109 F.3d at 8.
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ble." 6 The First Circuit further stated that the conduct with which Nip-
pon Paper was charged was illegal under both Japanese and American
law, thereby "alleviating any founded concern about NPI [Nippon Paper
International] being whipsawed between separate sovereigns. 61
Comity concerns are central to the political dimensions created by
this case. They provide the strongest reasons for moving this case out of
the judiciary and letting the more foreign-oriented bodies such as the
Legislative and Executive Branches handle this delicate matter. Comity
concerns are expressed in full in Section B of the Analysis Section of
this Note.
C. Judge Lynch's Concurring Opinion
The backbone of Judge Lynch's concurring opinion is his evaluation
of international law in accordance with the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States [hereinafter Restatement]. He
decided to accept this approach after concluding that "United States
courts have treated the Restatement as an illuminating outline of central
principles of international law. '"62 Judge Lynch relied heavily on Sections
40263 and 40364 for the articulation of general principles and Section
60. Id. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993). See
also Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Harford Fire
Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 281, 306-07 (1993).
61. Nippon Paper 11, 109 E3d at 8.
62. Id. at 11. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. at 799 (citing
Restatement); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("I shall rely on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law for the relevant prin-
ciples of international law. Its standards appear fairly supported in the decisions of this
Court construing international choice-of-law principles . . . and in the decisions of
other federal courts. ); In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1047-48
(2d Cir. 1996).
63. Restatement Section 402(1)(c) states that "Subject to § 403, 'a state has jurisdic-
tion to prescribe law to' conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987).
64. Restatement Section 403(1) states that "even when Section 402 has been satis-
fied, jurisdiction may not be exercised if it is 'unreasonable' ". RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987).
Section 403(2) lists factors to be evaluated in determining if jurisdiction is reasonable:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regu-
lated, or between the state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
[Vol. 23
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41565 for the application of those general principles to find the "Jurisdic-
tion to Regulate Anti-Competitive Activities." '66
Judge Lynch accepted the application of the Restatement's principles
and concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable in Nippon
Paper II, if approached with a step-by-step analysis of the requirements
of Section 403 and 415.67 First, Judge Lynch reasoned that because "rais-
ing prices in the United States and Canada was not only a purpose of the
alleged conspiracy, it was the purpose" of the conspiracy, the actions
satisfied Section 415's "principal purpose" requirement.6 Secondly, the
requirement of "some effect" on U.S. markets was amply satisfied.69
After concluding that Section 415's requirements were satisfied,
Judge Lynch assessed the reasonableness analysis concurrent with Section
403.70 He determined that the same factors from the Section 415 analysis
weighed heavily on the Section 403 analysis. 7' In addition, Judge Lynch
compared the relative interests of both the Japanese and U.S. govern-
ments and concluded that American interests were greater.72 The latter's
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the interna-
tional system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. at § 403(2). Section 403(3) is not applicable here. See id. at § 403(3) comment e.
65. "Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made outside of the
United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is carried out
predominantly outside of the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of
the United States, if a principal purpose of the conduct or agreement is to interfere with
the commerce of the United States and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that
commerce." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 415(2) (1987). Comment a to Section 415 states that the reasonable-
ness principles articulated in Section 403 must still be satisfied. See id. at comment a.
66. Nippon Paper I, 109 F.3d at 11.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id.
69. Id. The indictment alleged that Nippon Paper sold over six million dollars of fax
paper in the United States during 1990. In that same period, total sales of fax paper over-
all were roughly $100 million. Thus, Judge Lynch concluded that Nippon Paper's price
increases affected a significant share of the United States market. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.S v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. de-
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interest in protecting American consumers from price conspiracies was
deemed greater than the former's interest in prosecuting the conspirators.
Of particular importance was the fact that the alleged antitrust violations
were focused wholly on the North American market and had no direct,
adverse effects on Japanese consumers. Those factors were crucial in
Judge Lynch's comparison of the relative interests of the respective gov-
ernments. Thus, Japan would probably not enforce their own laws. An-
other factor that Judge Lynch considered in his Section 403 analysis was
that the effects on the United States market were. "foreseeable and di-
rect,"' 73 and not subject to varying interpretations. Also, Judge Lynch de-
termined that it was reasonable to assume that Nippon Paper was proba-
bly aware of the antitrust regulation in the international system, and their
justified expectations were not hurt by the regulation.74 The only factors
that Judge Lynch said weighed against U.S. jurisdiction at all was that
"the situs of the conduct was Japan and the principals were Japanese
corporations. ' 75 However, he concluded that "[t]his alone does not tip
the balance against jurisdiction."' 76
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Nippon Paper II court was not the first court to consider the is-
sues that extraterritoriality can bring into play when combined with anti-
trust rules and regulations. While the issue of criminal sanctions was a
matter of first impression, the Supreme Court had already established a
line of cases discussing extraterritoriality in civil cases. This line of cases
was neither recent nor excessively challenged over the years.
The earliest Supreme Court case to examine the role of extraterrito-
riality in the application of federal antitrust laws was American Banana
Company v. United Fruit Company.7 7 The Court there considered the ap-
nied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987). Since only North American markets were targeted,
Japan would have no interest in protecting Japanese consumers since they would be unaf-
fected by this conspiracy. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Judge Lynch agreed that criminal prosecution may have come as a surprise
to Nippon Paper. However, Nippon Paper should have known that civil antitrust liability
could include treble damages. A corporation found guilty of a criminal violation of Sec-
tion One is subject to a fine not exceeding $10 million. See 15 U.S.C. § 2. Treble dam-
ages obviously do not include a similar cap. 109 F.3d at 12 n. 11.
75. Nippon Paper 1I, 109 F.3d at 12.
76. Id. at 13.
77. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Both the plaintiff and the defendant were U.S. corpora-
tions engaged in the banana trade in Central America. For several years prior to the for-
mation of the plaintiff corporation, the defendant had been engaged in the practice of
purchasing the property and businesses of competitors for the express purpose of prevent-
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plication of the Sherman Antitrust Act on a civil action that occurred
wholly in Central America and had no discernible impact on imports into
the United States. Justice Holmes determined that the "general and al-
most universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done."'78 He stated that, in cases of doubt, a statute should be "confined
in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power."7 9 Holmes also noted that if
the courts were to act, it would result in "interference with the authority
of another sovereign" which would be "contrary to the comity of na-
tions, which the other state concerned justly might resent."8 0 Thus, the
holding of the court was that the defendant's actions abroad were not
proscribed by the Sherman Act.
Although the federal courts recognized the precedent established in
American Banana, they had begun to address the extraterritoriality issue
differently in United States v. Aluminum Company of America.8' In Al-
coa, the Second Circuit, sitting as a court of last resort,82 considered a
civil action brought under Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
action was brought against a Canadian corporation for acts committed
entirely abroad that produced substantial anti-competitive effects within
the United States . 3 Judge Learned Hand read the American Banana deci-
ing competition and to control and monopolize the banana trade. Id. at 354. The prede-
cessor to the plaintiff had begun to build a railway (which was his only means of export).
Due to the inducement of the defendant, the Costa Rican government interfered with the
construction of the railway. In the middle of the construction in the November of 1903,
Panama revolted and became an independent republic. In June of 1904, the plaintiff pur-
chased the predecessor and began to operate under the laws of Panama. In July of 1904,
the Costa Rican government, under the defendant's inducement, seized part of the plain-
tiff's banana plantation and stopped construction of the railway. As a result of the defend-
ant's acts, the plaintiff was deprived of the use of the plantation and the railway and sub-
sequently injured. Id.
78. Id. at 356.
79. Id. at 357.
80. Id. at 356.
81. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
82. Thus, the decision carries almost Supreme Court stature since the Supreme
Court, lacking a quorum of six qualified judges, had certified the case to the Second Cir-
cuit as a special statutory court. 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 828 (1994). See 15 U.S.C. §
29 (authorizing designation of a court of appeals as a court of last resort for certain anti-
trust actions). See also Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yo-
kosuka & Yokota, and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821 (1994).
83. The allegation was that the defendant, Alcoa, was monopolizing interstate and
foreign commerce, particularly in the manufacture and sale of "virgin" aluminum ingot.
148 F2d at 422. The crux of the monopolization argument is that Alcoa entered into an
exclusive contract with the only holder of the patent necessary to smelt the aluminum un-
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sion narrowly and decided that the case should be narrowly tailored "for
conduct which has no consequences within the United States."'8 4 But
Judge Hand expanded the court's role into extraterritoriality and declared
that "a sovereign ordinarily can impose liability for conduct outside its
borders that produces consequences within them."' 85 This premise pro-
vided the basis of Judge Hand's controversial "effects" test. This test
would allow application of the Sherman Act to conduct occurring outside
of the United States where there is both (1) an intent to affect, and (2) an
actual effect on U.S. commerce, regardless of whether the conduct was
undertaken by foreign nationals. 86 He acknowledged that comity consider-
ations demanded the refusal to apply Section One actions where there
was no effect within the United States (as in the American Banana
scenario).
Judge Hand addressed the consideration that the statute, when prop-
erly interpreted, did proscribe extraterritorial acts which were "intended
to affect imports [to the United States] and did affect them."'87 Thus the
Alcoa court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality had been
overcome and the Sherman Act had been violated.88 Particularly relevant
to this holding is the interpretation of Judge Learned Hand's controversial
"effects" test established in Alcoa. This test established that the Sherman
Act may be applied to conduct outside the United States where there is
both an intent to affect and an actual effect on U.S. commerce even if
such conduct is undertaken by foreign nationals.8 9 Controversy sur-
rounded the Alcoa test from the start and many commentators have criti-
cized it as being inconsistent with international law and insensitive to in-
ternational comity principles.90
Any confusion and tension that the decisions in American Banana
and Alcoa spawned, however, were cleared up with the Supreme Court's
most recent decision exploring the extent of the Sherman Act's extraterri-
torial reach. In Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California,91 the
Court upheld the central holding of the Alcoa decision and permitted the
til 1909. Id. After 1909, it was alleged that Alcoa purchased and sold several power com-
panies with covenants binding the power companies not to sell or let power to anyone
else for the manufacture of aluminum. Id.
84. Id. at 443.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 444.
87. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (1945).
88. See id. at 444-45.
89. Id. at 444.
90. See Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka &
Yokota, and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV 821, 829 (1994).
91. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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Section One claim to proceed despite the fact that the alleged antitrust
actions occurred entirely on foreign soil. 92 While the Court noted the dis-
agreement between American Banana and Alcoa, the Court declared that
it was "well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substan-
tial effect in the United States." 93
The situation before the Hartford Fire court was complicated by the
fact that the British reinsurers' activity may have been perfectly legal
under British law. The court announced that such conduct did not by it-
self bar application of United States antitrust laws. But, the Court de-
clined to consider whether it would have been barred since the reinsurers
did not contend that the British law required them to act in a fashion that
was prohibited by the law of the United States. 94 The Hartford Fire court
refused to place any weight on the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement
Acts of 1982 (FTAIA). 95 While the Hartford Fire decision was barely a
majority decision (5-4), the four dissenting Justices expressed complete
agreement with the majority's views on extraterritoriality. 96
The Hartford Fire court did briefly discuss the concerns of interna-
tional comity (which would become the focus of the Nippon Paper con-
troversy). First, the Court declared that "[n]o conflict exists . .. where
a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of
92. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant insurance companies violated the Sher-
man Act by engaging in various conspiracies to restrict the terms of coverage of commer-
cial general liability (CGL) insurance available in the United States by forcing primary
insurers (insurers who sell insurance directly to consumers) to change the terms of their
standard CGL insurance policies to conform with the policies the defendant insurers
wanted to sell. Id. at 769-71.
93. Id. at 796.
94. Id. at 797.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994). The FTAIA Section 6a deals with conduct involving
trade and commerce with foreign nations. It reads that "[s]ections 1 to 7 of [Title 15 -
Commerce and Trade] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than
import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless--(1) such conduct had a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-(A) on trade or commerce with for-
eign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or (B) on ex-
port trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or
commerce in the United States; and (2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provi-
sions of section 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section." Id. The Hartford Court stated
that the FTAIA was intended to exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions that
did not injure the United States economy. The Court arrived at these conclusions by ex-
amining the legislative history and the explicit wording of section 6a(1)(A) which de-
clares that unless "such conduct had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef-
fect" on domestic and import commerce. Hartford at 796 n. 23.
96. See 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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both." 97 However, this statement is not particularly helpful since the
Court merely quoted the wording of the Restatement and failed to dis-
cuss the issue any further. Thus, the case provides no guidelines or direc-
tions for future analysis. Second, because the British insurers had not ar-
gued that British law required them to act in a fashion contrary to United
States law, the Court concluded that it did not have to consider whether
there was any conflict with British law.98 Thus, the court's brief discus-
sion of international comity leads to the conclusion that the court "has
no need in this litigation to address other considerations that might in-
form a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of
international comity." 99
Hartford Fire represents the current thinking of the Supreme Court
on the extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust laws in the civil
context. The Court explicitly stated that the Sherman Antitrust Act was
meant to apply to foreign conduct that both intended to and did in fact
produce a substantial effect in the United States. The issue of whether
criminal and civil penalties are sufficiently divergent to warrant distinct
applications of the law is a point that the defendants relied on heavily.
That issue and its credibility were explored and rejected by the Nippon
Paper II court, and the analysis section of this paper will do the same.
Thus, the chain of case law, from American Banana to Hartford
Fire, discussing the extraterritorial application of federal antitrust laws in
civil actions, seems conclusive in determining that prosecutions for
wholly foreign conduct are predicated upon whether there is an intended
and substantial effect in the United States that permits the case to come
within the jurisdictional reach of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.Ioo
The Nippon Paper decisions were a matter of first impression. Un-
like the earlier line of cases that explored the jurisdictional reach of
American courts in civil antitrust actions, the Nippon Paper courts faced
a criminal prosecution for solely extraterritorial conduct rather than the
tried and tested civil actions. 01
97. Id. at 799.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987).
101. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Nippon Paper H, the First Circuit held that there was no differ-
ence between the civil and criminal provisions of Section One of the
Sherman Antitrust Laws. Thus, the First Circuit has declared that courts
should follow two guidelines for deciding cases on this issue. First, the
court should follow the line of cases permitting application of the civil
provisions of the federal antitrust laws for wholly extraterritorial conduct.
Second, the courts should apply the criminal provisions of the antitrust
laws in similar civil circumstances. In doing so, the First Circuit has
made application of U.S. laws consistent with one another. However, it
has also pushed the boundaries of international comity. By allowing ap-
plication of criminal provisions of Section One to conduct which was in-
tended to effect American interests but occurred wholly on foreign soil,
the United States has vastly expanded its power in the global market-
place without consideration of the sovereignty of other nations. Should
the U.S. have criminal jurisdiction over defendants for actions that occur
wholly on foreign soil and under the umbrella of laws of another sover-
eign state, without respect for international comity?
A. A Holding in Harmony with Precedent and Expectation
When the District Court dismissed the indictment against Nippon
Paper and held that Section One did not give prosecutors the authority to
bring criminal antitrust charges extraterritorially when there was no clear
U.S. nexus, it was a surprising decision. It was a shock to scholars and
attorneys within the antitrust field who had expected that the Sherman
Act was applied to all cases of foreign conduct with an intended effect in
the U.S.'0 2 Prior to the Nippon Paper I case, an understanding existed
within the antitrust community that there was no distinction between civil
and criminal cases. 0 3 It had been the standard to evaluate conduct occur-
ring outside of the United States on the basis of whether the acts have "a
foreseeable, intentional, direct, and substantial effect on U.S. com-
merce."'l4 Practitioners expected that Nippon Paper II would allow crim-
inal prosecutions for wholly foreign conduct since the same practitioners
had been pursuing allegations of anti-competitive conspiracies by foreign
companies based on the "substantial impact on U.S. commerce"
102. Dominic Bencivenga, Criminal Antitrust Upset: Ruling Limits Pursuit of For-
eign Conspiracies. N.YL.J. 5 (Sept. 19, 1996)
103. Id.
104. Id. quoting Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, an antitrust partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison.
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standard. 105
In order to follow the line of precedent, Judge Selya, writing for the
majority in Nippon Paper II, gave sufficient legal basis to parallel the
Nippon Paper case with the holdings of Alcoa and Hartford Fire.°6 By
following the basic principles of statutory construction, the First Circuit
was able to conclude that there was no distinction between the criminal
and civil provisions in the language of Section One. 07 The Court used
the solid base of the statutory construction argument to dismiss the op-
posing contentions of the defendants without much hesitation. The court
admitted that it could uphold the dismissal if there were sufficient "spe-
cial circumstances" presented in the case at hand.108 While four of the
asserted arguments of Nippon Paper were weak at best and properly dis-
posed of by the Court, 1°9 the fifth argument, that of international comity,
was too easily dismissed by the First Circuit. The fifth argument deserves
more attention before a decision to impose United States law on foreign
activities is finalized.
B. A Holding in Conflict with International Comity
The First Circuit was quick to devalue the importance of interna-
tional comity in Nippon Paper II by dismissing it as "more an aspiration
than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of obligation."" 0
The Court relied upon the notion that, with the growth of international
commerce, a foreign decision has more impact on the domestic market-
place."' Thus, the Court used the excuse of a constantly intertwining
global marketplace to downplay the importance of international comity.
However, the exact opposite conclusion, that international comity is of
growing importance due to the shift in the world markets, could be
reached from the same reasoning. In fact, when Nippon Paper filed for
105. See id.
106. See generally U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987).
107. See id. at 4-6.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. The "lack of precedent," "difference in strength of presumption," and
"rule of lenity" arguments were either improper in the Nippon Paper case or lacked any
probative worth. See generally id. at 6-8. The "Restatement" argument was amply re-
buked and used to support the majority's holding and Judge Lynch's concurring opinion.
Id. at 9-13.
110. Id. at 8.
111. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998) (96-1987). "We live in an age of international commerce,
where decisions reached in one comer of the world can reverberate around the globe in
less time than it takes to tell the tale." Id.
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certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was supported by the Japanese govern-
ment, which contended that prosecution in the United States would be an
affront to Japanese sovereignty. 1" 2 Nippon Paper's argument against the
First Circuit's decision, which was supported by the Japanese govern-
ment, declared that "the decision violated international sovereignty and
could spark retaliatory action." 1 3
Regardless of the decisions and interpretations that the courts of the
United States may make regarding the importance of international comity
in deciding the Nippon Paper case, foreign governments regard interna-
tional comity as an important consideration. 114 This viewpoint held by
foreign governments makes the Nippon Paper case and any subsequent
decisions have political dimensions that the judicial system is not pre-
pared to handle. Foreign relations are better handled by the legislative
and executive bodies, which are more experienced in such matters.
Nippon Paper will have political repercussions independent of the
legal system. International comity is an important component of a state's
political sovereignty. It is imprudent for the United States, through its ju-
dicial system, to enforce its own domestic laws without consideration for
the rules and laws that govern other sovereign states. The world is a col-
lection of individual states that may be intertwined by markets, but there
is no homogenous law that governs all of those states identically. The
purpose of international comity is to respect an individual state's own
choice of government and sovereignty. The various United States courts
that ignore those concerns completely ignore the right of foreign states to
govern their own citizens and themselves.
One potential source of America's fervent desire to enforce domestic
antitrust laws is the growing protectionism that pervades the Antitrust Di-
112. Bob Drummond, Supreme Court Expedites Dispute Over Phone Rates, THE
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Jan. 13, 1998, at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File. In the statement that the Japanese government submitted to the Supreme
Court, the Japanese government was explicit in stating that the extraterritorial application
on the U.S. antitrust law violated international law. They argued that "[i]n accordance
with international law, anti-competitive activities occurring within Japanese territory and
committed by Japanese corporations fall within the scope of Japanese jurisdiction and are
regulated by Japanese legislation." U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Nippon Paper's Appeal,
JIJI PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Jan. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
113. Mark Suzman, Go-ahead for Criminal Cases, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 13,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
114. The Japanese government said in its statement [to the U.S. Supreme Court sup-
porting Nippon Paper's petition] that it has "a substantial interest in this case because of
the principles of international law and sovereignty that it implicates." U.S. Supreme
Court Rejects Nippon Paper's Appeal, JIJI PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Jan. 13, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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vision of the Department of Justice and international antitrust enforce-
ment in general. 115 The Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Divi-
sion has stated that "as markets increasingly become global in nature,
vigorous antitrust enforcement will help to ensure that American busi-
nesses will have the necessary incentives and ability to compete success-
fully on a global scale."' 16 He stressed that "antitrust enforcement is vi-
tal to America's economic health" because "American consumers and
businesses benefit from a free market economy with antitrust enforce-
ment."" 7 The protectionist views of the Antitrust Division are more
clearly seen when he explained that a challenge "from globalization is
the need to ensure that our jurisdiction is sufficient to protect U.S. con-
sumers against anti-competitive actions by foreign companies," and also
that "anti-competitive activity ... increasingly takes place in the inter-
national marketplace to the detriment of U.S. consumers and busi-
nesses."'1 8 Despite a lengthy discussion about cooperation with foreign
antitrust officials, the general focus of the statement by the Antitrust Di-
vision is the importance of using U.S. antitrust laws to protect U.S. con-
sumers. 9 This position may seem harmless enough but has severe politi-
cal consequences when it asserts United States domestic laws without
concern for the sovereignty of other nations.
One of the central concerns with the Antitrust Division's position is
that it dismisses some aspects of the free market system while holding on
to others. The belief that the "American consumers benefit from a free
market economy with antitrust enforcement" 120 is debatable at best. As
many economists will assert, regulation throws off the balance of the free
market system. One position of economic thought holds that "[w]hile the
extraterritorial application of sound law may have a therapeutic effect on
global markets, the same cannot be said for antitrust statutes. In the first
place, antitrust laws are typically ineffective because they are based on
faulty economics and anachronistic notions of competitive behavior. Also,
like any form of government intervention, antitrust legislation distorts the
market's asset allocation mechanisms and creates inefficiencies."' 12 1 The
115. "Discredited by economic reality, international antitrust enforcement is now the
lethal weapon of protectionists." Teresa Wyszomierski, Lessons of the Boeing Merger,
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, July 29, 1997, at 8A.
116. Prepared Statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Divi-
sion Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Federal News Service, Nov. 5, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Teresa Wyszomierski, Lessons of the Boeing Merger, JOURNAL OF COM-
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problem is that by using antitrust statutes in a protectionist manner,
"they are retarding global market efficiency while instigating serious and
protracted trade wars." 22 The notion of a viable free market with heavy
governmental regulation is anathema to the principles of a free market
system. There is no basis for believing that globalization of the economy
will have a negative impact on the consumer. Though Nippon Paper was
engaged in price-fixing, Japanese domestic laws also condemned the
practice. Foreign nations have domestic laws that prohibit the practice.
Experience has demonstrated that mergers and consolidation have
often had beneficial or negligible impacts on consumers. 23 This is not to
say that Nippon Paper's actions should be condoned. It is merely that the
Japanese government had the primary duty of disciplining the company,
and not the United States, since Nippon Paper is a corporation created
and acting wholly in Japan, not within the U.S. It is a recognizable state
interest to seek to enforce its own laws. It is a direct interference with
state sovereignty for a foreign state to apply its laws without opportunity
for the domestic state to institute its own legal protections first. The U.S.
government has a role in enforcing its own antitrust provisions. However,
that role is secondary in this case and should not have been invoked until
after Japan had decided not to pursue the issue through its own internal
antitrust system first.
In addition, the First Circuit was quick to accept the dicta of the
Hartford Fire court which suggested that comity concerns would only
operate to defeat the exercise of jurisdiction in those few cases in which
the law of the foreign sovereign required a defendant to act in a manner
incompatible with the Sherman Act or in which full compliance with
both statutory schemes was impossible. 124 The Court then applied the
Hartford Fire reasoning to the case at hand and found that Nippon Pa-
per's activities were illegal under both Japanese and American laws,
thereby dismissing any concern about Nippon Paper being subjected to
the will of two opposing sovereign states. 25
MERCE, July 29, 1997, at 8A. The purpose of this article is the illustrate how the Sher-
man Antitrust Act has become the "protectionist weapon of choice in the global arena."
Id.
122. Id.
123. "Over a century of American experience shows that few, if any, industries
were made less competitive by mergers. In fact, in industry after industry that has seen
consolidation-oil services, cosmetics, disk drives, office products-prices remained flat
or even dropped." Id. While this position is controversial and debatable, it demonstrates
that consolidation is not universally deleterious.
124. Nippon Paper II, 109 F.3d at 8; see also Hartford Fire Insur Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993).
125. Id..
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While the First Circuit's decision that comity is not a saving grace
in the Nippon Paper case was a proper one, the decision to ignore com-
ity could potentially have severe repercussions. Comity is assuredly an
important concern. It alone is outweighed by the rights of consumers to
assert their rights, regardless of the antitrust violator's extraterritorial lo-
cation. Comity is a factor that should be applied in tandem with other
factors. Comity alone provides a weak basis for ignoring the rights of
consumers. In the case of Nippon Paper, there were no additional com-
pelling concerns and comity was left to be asserted by itself. Without ad-
ditional compelling factors, it was assuredly proper for the First Circuit
to decide that comity alone could not act to save Nippon Paper.
However, as a consequence of downplaying the importance of com-
ity, the instant case sets a dangerous precedent for those more complex
cases that may follow. The holding of the Nippon Paper II case could
easily be used to draw a presumption in favor of disregarding comity in
later cases. This result may be inevitable due to the First Circuit's deci-
sion to minimize the importance of comity in the Nippon Paper II
case. 126 If the court had properly addressed the role of comity as a factor
to be considered when relevant, the potential for future harm would be
minimized.
Comity concerns are a factor to be considered in analyzing any case
involving international antitrust issues. Comity is a factor that should be
considered in tandem with any other factors that are relevant in the par-
ticular case. Comity concerns alone should be insufficient to invalidate
an antitrust measure. It is only when comity concerns are present along-
side other questionable factors that an antitrust statute should be disre-
garded. Comity is factor that carries great weight but that weight is de-
pendent upon other factors to meet the burden of proving improper
international interference with trade. The Nippon Paper scenario involved
other factors that proceeded to meet the necessary burden but the Court
failed to discuss those factors and their role in deciding the case as they
did. In a manner, the Nippon Paper court applied a comity test but failed
to explain it as such and merely presented their result.
As international trade and commerce become more intertwined, deci-
sions of international comity will become more important as isolationism
becomes a less viable option. Sovereign states desire to have jurisdiction
over their own citizens. The doctrine of international comity is not about
legal decisions or precedent. Rather, it is a political question dealing with
a state's own right of sovereignty. It is a political question for interna-
tional bodies to decide. It is not the proper place for domestic courts to
126. See id.
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decide that a domestic law is proper over foreign subjects. The world is
growing more interdependent, but we are not yet citizens of the world
and it is improper to ignore other states' sovereignty by prosecuting for-
eign citizens under our own domestic laws. Contrary to the suggestions
of the dicta of the Nippon Paper II, comity is a more a matter of obliga-
tion than a matter of grace. 27
C. Later Cases Citing to Nippon Paper II
Cases decided after the Nippon Paper II decision have not addressed
the fundamental issue of jurisdictional reach for criminal violations of the
antitrust laws for wholly foreign conduct. Instead, the later cases that
have cited to the Nippon Paper II decision have focused on a range of
issues from statutory construction, 28 the appropriate standard of appellate
review, 29 the boundaries of international comity, 130 and even on the rule
of lenity.131
V. CONCLUSION
The First Circuit has extended the jurisdictional reach of the United
States courts to punish wholly extraterritorial conduct for criminal viola-
tions of the U.S. antitrust laws. In doing so, this aligns the courts with
the line of reasoning that created the same jurisdictional reach for civil
violations. On January 12, 1998, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Nippon Paper H.132 However, this case is far from over and gone; it still
must be tried again and decisions will surely be appealed.
Undoubtably other situations will arise where the line is more vague
and the requirements of two different jurisdictions will cause companies
to find a middle ground between the laws of the two separate sovereigns.
127. But cf. Nippon Paper II, 109 F.3d at 8 (where the court instructs that comity is
more a matter of grace than of obligation).
128. See In the Matter of. 203 N. Lasalle Street Partnership, 1997 WL 602640 at
*15 (7th Cir. IlI). (Sept. 29, 1997) (citing Nippon Paper I for the "basic principle of
statutory construction.")
129. See U.S. v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 42 (1997) (citing Nippon Paper II for the use
of plenary review after the dismissal of an indictment on constitutional grounds raising a
pure question of law).
130. See Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, 1997 WL 576005 at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (citing Nippon Paper II for the boundaries on the doctrine of international comity).
131. See U.S. v. Bowen, 1997 WL 577662 (1st Cir. Me.) (1997) (citing Nippon Pa-
per 11's collection of cases for the proposition that "the rule of lenity commands that in
cases of genuine ambiguities affecting a criminal statute's scope be resolved in the
defendant's favor" [emphasis added]).
132. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 685
(1998) (No. 96-1987).
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Considering the current protectionist attitude of United States antitrust
enforcers, it is possible they will not back down even when foreign gov-
ernments cause businesses to act in ways contrary to the benefit of the
American economy. These regulators have been granted a weapon that
will assuredly be stretched to the point where the very courts that have
sanctioned its use will have to mandate its limitations. The Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari leaves the First Circuit's decision in effect. 133
This will result in the United States having the power to assess criminal
charges for violations, which, consequently, shall greatly expand the
United States' power to shape the global marketplace. The "stigma
[which] accompanies a criminal conviction, especially when one envi-
sions a Japanese executive sitting in prison for three years or being
barred from entering the United States" 134 is greater than mere assess-
ments of civil fines on large, faceless corporations. The U.S. government
has added a new weapon to its arsenal and it will likely have a signifi-
cant effect on the process of international law and the balance of interna-
tional trade. 135
James A. Griffith
133. This only means that prosecutors can proceed with the trial. Even if convicted,
Nippon Paper could still appeal and renew its previous objection to United States juris-
diction at that time. Precisely due to the prospect for a post-conviction appeal, the Justice
Department urged the court to reject consideration of Nippon Paper's pretrial petition.
Genevieve Buck, Justices Decline to Hear Case, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 13, 1998, at
Business, pg 1., available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
134. John Gibeaut. Sherman Goes Abroad: Landmark Decision Oks International
Antitrust Prosecution. 83 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (1997).
135. As this article was going to press, a note was.published in 33 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 189 that also addressed the Nippon Paper II decision. These two articles present
varying interpretations of the impact and ramifications of the Nippon Paper I decision.
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